This paper provides evidence for the existence of a wage curve --a microeconometric association between the level of pay and the local unemployment rate --in modern U.S. data. Consistent with recent evidence from more than 40 other countries, the wage curve in the United States has a long-run elasticity of approximately -0.1. In line with the paper's theoretical framework: (i) wages are higher in states with more generous unemployment benefits, (ii) the perceived probability of job-finding is lower in states with higher unemployment, and (iii) employees are less happy in states that have higher unemployment. We conclude that it is reasonable to view the wage curve as an empirical law of economics.
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What can be learned from this work? Although inevitably imperfect, the statistical law of a wage curve with an elasticity of -0.1 has turned out to fit the data surprisingly well. 5 Interestingly, results for the Scandinavian countries emerge somewhat below the -0.1 estimate (e.g. Pekkarinen (2001) ; Brunstad and Dyrstad (1997) ; Holmlund and Skedinger (1990) ). There is also evidence from one or two of the former communist countries of an elasticity far above the -0.1 estimate (e.g. Blanchflower (2001) ; Pastore and Verashchagina (2004) ; and Pannenberg and Schwarz (1998) ) although other papers for these countries do find numbers close to -0.1 (such as Kollo (1997, 1999) ; Duffy and Walsh (2002) ; Elhorst et al. (2002) ; and Kallai and Traistaru (2001) ).
A recent meta-analysis --on a sample of 208 wage/unemployment wage curve elasticities from the literature --by Nijkamp and Poot (2005) concludes that "the wage curve is a robust empirical phenomenon … but there is … evidence of publication bias. There is indeed an uncorrected mean estimate of about -0.1 for the elasticity. After controlling for publication bias by means of two different methods, we estimate that the 'true' wage curve elasticity at the means of study characteristics is about -0.07". Nijkamp and Poot (2005) also test for, and find no evidence of, what they term a Blanchflower/Oswald 'advocacy' effect.
Most economists are unlikely to feel strongly about the possible difference between a wage curve elasticity estimate of -0.07 and one of -0.1. What matters more is whether there are countries in which a wage curve cannot reliably be found. Here the case of the United States needs to be confronted.
The Data Reloaded
Is there, or is there not, a U.S. wage curve? Given that wage curves have been found for many dozens of other nations, it would be remarkable, and presumably important, if the same were not true in the United States.
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to study the patterns in modern United States data. We reestimate the U.S. wage curve on a state level panel using CPS data from 1980-2001. We explore points made by Blanchard and Katz (1997) .
Our results suggest that the United States has more autoregression in pay than many nations, but that there is much evidence of a U.S. wage curve. This has implications that seem to matter. It means, first, that US labor markets may not be fundamentally different from other nations' labor markets (contrary to what is sometimes claimed), and, second, that macroeconomists who use the Phillips Curve in modeling might wish to work more with micro data.
Any labor economist would argue that wages and unemployment are simultaneously determined. Within the wage-curve debate, therefore, issues of identification and measurement will matter. Moreover, given that wages are famously sticky, it is unlikely that it will be straightforward to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects on pay. Wage dynamics can be expected to play a central role.
Put informally, four views are visible in the economics literature.
Idea 1 (Phillips) . The rate of growth of pay is inversely related to the unemployment rate. This hypothesis is explored in Phillips' 1958 Economica paper. He used a long run of aggregate time series data for Britain. The idea of a function dw/dt = f(U) is not necessarily a-theoretical. It can be justified by appealing to the notion that excess supply of a commodity gradually pushes down the price of that commodity. Here f(.) has a negative gradient. But Phillips was not clear about whether any relationship was to be expected between the level of wages, w, and unemployment, U. Sargan (1964) was later to argue a version of that.
Idea 2 (Harris-Todaro)
To take a job in a region or industry (or in principle even a country) that experiences a lot of unemployment, the typical worker needs to be paid well. This is an application of the concept of compensating differentials. A state like West Virginia, which traditionally has had one of the highest rates of joblessness in the United States, should in equilibrium offer better pay than one with persistently low unemployment. Otherwise workers will find life too risky to stay. At the region or industry level, therefore, w = g(U). Here the function g(.) will have a positive gradient.
Idea 3 (The wage curve).
In most countries, it has been found, following Blanchflower and Oswald, that regions with higher unemployment have lower wages. One way to rationalize such a discovery is to appeal to non-competitive theories of the labor market -for example to the idea of a no-shirking condition or a bargaining-power effect. According to this kind of analytical framework, higher local unemployment makes life tougher for workers (for example, they will find it harder to obtain work if laid off by their current employer), and therefore it is not necessary for employers to remunerate those individuals so well. Here w = h(U), and the h(.) function has a negative gradient.
Idea 4 (Labor demand and supply).
If unemployment can in some circumstances be viewed as the negative of employment, an observed function w = j(U) might be construed as a labor demand or supply function. This logic might be thought to be a stretch, because labor demand and supply theory is not typically framed in unemployment space. Nevertheless, a function w = j(U) might be seen as some kind of demand or supply curve written in mild disguise. If j(U) is a miss-specified labor supply function, for example, it might be argued that j(U) would have a negative gradient. If it is a miss-specified demand function, it might be expected to have a positive gradient.
Among these four views, there is currently disagreement, and perhaps even confusion, in labor economics and macroeconomics. We think the current position is this. The average US labor economist believes in Harris-Todaro and, with a bit of skepticism along the way about the nature of macroeconomic data, also believes in some form of Phillips Curve. The average European labour economist does not believe in Harris-Todaro and, with a bit more respect along the way for macroeconomic data, believes in some form of wage curve.
Recent debate has probably been hampered by a tendency for researchers to concentrate on extremes. Some commentators, for example, interpret Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) as arguing for a necessarily static wage curve without any autoregression in wages (although the book includes estimated equations with lags on the dependent variable). Similarly, because Phillips's original article does not discuss the possibility of dynamics other than a unit root in the pay equation, the macroeconomics literature has been dominated by simple functional forms.
We aim to find common ground between disagreements in Blanchard and Katz (1997, 1999) , Staiger, Stock and Watson (2002) , Card and Hyslop (1997) , Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) , Bell, Nickell and Quintini (2002) , Barth et al (2002a, b), and Fares (2002) .
A theoretical framework
If wages and unemployment are simultaneously determined, how should we think about the spatial patterns in pay and joblessness? A model favored by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) draws on efficiency wage theory. An illustrative version is as follows.
Consider an economy consisting of just two regions. The following assumptions are made about region 1 and, with small modifications, also about region 2.
A1
Assume that workers are risk-neutral. They get utility from income and disutility from effort. Define the wage as w and the level of on-the-job effort as e. Assume that a worker's utility equals the simple difference between income and effort, so that utility is u = w -e.
A2
Assume that effort at work, e, is a fixed number determined by technology, but that individual employees can decide to "shirk" and exert zero effort. If undetected by the firm, these individuals earn wage w and have e = 0, so that u = w. They are then better off than employees who provide effort.
A3
An individual who shirks runs the risk of being detected. Designate as the probability of successfully shirking, that is, of escaping detection. Assume that anyone caught shirking is fired, and has then to find work elsewhere (at required effort e). Let the expected utility of a fired worker be w . Define it
This is a convex combination of w -e, the utility from working at the required effort level, and of b, which is defined as the income value of unemployment benefit plus leisure. The function α(U) measures the probability of finding work, and how that is affected by the level of unemployment, U, prevailing in the local labor market.
A4
Assume that there is a constant rate of break-up, r, of firms. In steady-state equilibrium, total new hires in the local economy are α[L -n] where L is working population and n is employment,
This implicitly defines a function α(U) where the first derivative is negative and the second derivative is positive. Thus the probability of finding a job, α, is a convex function of the unemployment rate, U.
A5 Equivalent equations hold in the second region.
A6 However, the second region differs from the first in that both workers and non-workers enjoy a non-pecuniary benefit, ø, from living in the region.
A7
Each region is affected by shocks to the demand for labor. The shock variable is denoted s in region 1, with a density function g(s). There is an equivalent shock variable in region 2, with density h(.). These shocks could be thought of as exogenous movements in real input prices, but other interpretations are possible.
A8
Workers are free, between periods, to choose to live in whichever region they prefer. They cannot migrate during a period.
The assumptions given above describe a form of efficiency-wage model. The model's key characteristic is that employers must pay a wage that is sufficiently high to induce employees not to shirk. In equilibrium, workers must be behaving optimally in their effort decisions, and firms must be behaving optimally in their wage-setting. Regions differ in their non-pecuniary attractions: one of the two is a nicer place to live than the other. Excluding degenerate equilibria, however, each region must offer workers the same level of expected utility. This condition defines a zero-migration equilibrium. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) show that the following result can be proved. 
The convexity of the wage curve follows from the convexity of the α(U) function, and can be checked by differentiation. Intuitively, as unemployment U rises, firms realize that their employees are inherently more frightened of losing their jobs, and can pay lower levels of remuneration while maintaining the necessary degree of worker effort. A corollary is:
Proposition 2: There is involuntary unemployment in equilibrium.
The details of the proofs, and other associated corollaries, are given on pages 66-69 of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) .
Empirical Issues
In this paper we attempt to implement empirically a version of Equation 2.
First, a logarithmic wage equation is estimated. This is not essential but follows convention in the labor literature. Second, we test for the influence of unemployment benefits, b, within a wage equation. Although it follows directly from the theory, we have been unable to find a literature on testing for the effects of benefit levels in regional or state-level wage equations. The previous wage-curve literature has been unable to do so, but in US data it is possible to use information on state unemployment insurance payments to construct a value for the b variable across space. If information on b is not available, it might be argued, as in Blanchard and Katz (1999) , that the coefficient on any lagged dependent variable will be biased. Third, following the previous wage-curve literature, the nonlinear function embedded within equation 2 is approximated empirically by a logarithmic function of unemployment, U. This is primarily for simplicity. Fourth, equations are estimated with a lagged dependent variable (that is, a regressor w t-1 ). This is to measure the degree of autoregression in pay, and to allow a direct check for pure Phillips Curve specifications. Fifth, implicit in the analysis will be the assumption that joblessness makes people unhappy, that is, that unemployment benefits b do not make up sufficiently for the drop in utility upon loss of a job; this is consistent with empirical evidence on psychological wellbeing, such as that in Clark and Oswald (1994) .
Identification issues have to be addressed. Here the form of wage equation makes it natural to use benefits b as an instrument for wages w. To complete the model, an unemployment equation is also needed. We assume it is a second-order AR process, derived from a neoclassical demand curve for labor, and use two lags on U as instruments for unemployment. Later in the paper we estimate this function U t = Ω(U t-1 , U t-2 , w t , controls) directly. There is a potential difficulty with the ORG earnings or wage data. Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) have pointed out that over 30 per cent of workers in the ORG data files have their earnings imputed using a "cell hot deck" method. The authors argue that this can create downward biases when the attribute being studied (e.g. union status) is not a criterion used in the imputation itself. In addition, there will be biases in other variables, such as schooling, where we understand only a limited number of controls (4) Most states have benefit levels that are intended to replace a little under one half of lost wages. However, there are maxima and minima on payments to unemployed individuals, and these are the source of much of the state-by-state variation in the data.
The maxima guarantee that many high-wage workers will receive less than half their average lost earnings; the minima mean that some low-wage workers earn more than fifty percent of their lost wages. There are considerable differences by state in the benefits maxima. In 1995, for instance, these ranged from a low of $175 per week in Missouri to a high of $362 in New Jersey (O'Leary and Rubin, 1997, page 174). The average wage replacement rate since 1938 has been approximately 35% (O'Leary and Rubin, 1997).
As an illustration, the Appendix gives data on benefit levels and replacement rates for the year 2000. The highest average level of benefits was in Massachusetts ($293) and the lowest in Puerto Rico ($104) and Mississippi ($157). Replacement rates --defined as the proportion of workers' income replaced by benefits --were greatest in Hawaii (50%) and lowest in California (20%).
Results on Hourly and Annual Wages and Earnings
In the US there was an early literature which found evidence of a positive relationship between wages and the unemployment rate. This includes papers by Hall (1970 Hall ( , 1972 , Reza (1978) , Behman (1978) , Roback (1982) , Adams (1985) , Marston (1985) and Topel (1986) . In Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) we showed that such results were sensitive to the inclusion of region fixed-effects and to the time period used.
If few or no controls are used, the state-level correlation in the United States between wage levels and unemployment rates is positive. This can be viewed as a version of Harris-Todaro compensating differentials. As an illustration, on the latest US data, and after pooling the years 1979-2002, we obtain the following simple forms for log hourly earnings equations (where state unemployment is U): These three equations include a set of year dummies ; t-statistics are in parentheses.
Here it can be seen that the cross-section correlation between pay and joblessness is indeed positive, with an elasticity of 0.0333, when state dummies are omitted (there are no controls in this equation: the estimation is simply on year-state cell averages). Yet, in the spirit of a wage curve, the introduction of state dummies, in the second column, overturns the Harris-Todaro positive slope. The gradient changes to -0.0188 with a t-statistic of 2.72. A similar finding is produced in the third column where, instead of state dummies, the long-run average unemployment rate over the period (denoted LR average Log U) is entered as a regressor. There is then evidence of both a negative effect from the level of current unemployment and a positive effect from the long run average of unemployment. These elementary equations are not, of course, complete specifications. They are designed instead to illustrate how a Harris-Todaro positive correlation between area unemployment and area wages comes to be reversed. Table 1 is provided as a benchmark or extreme. Year dummies are included. State dummies are omitted. This column 1 specification gives the impression that an approximate Phillips Curve operates: the coefficient on lagged wages is 0.955. In other words, the equation is close to being one that could be rewritten with a pure change in log wage as the dependent variable (which would be literally correct if the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable were 1.0). The control variables in column 1 are age, age squared, and the percentage male --all measured as state averages --along with twenty year-dummies to pick up U.S.-wide changes in the labor market. A union density variable is also included, which enters positively and significantly.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that there is a simple regional Phillips Curve in these data. The addition of a set of state fixed-effects and industry controls has a marked effect (the industry controls are the proportion of workers in a 2-digit industry in a state-year cell). As can be seen, in column 2 of Table 1 , the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable drops to 0.6990. This means, solving out for the steady-state level of wages, that the long run unemployment elasticity of wages is now estimated at -0.08. This number is obtained by dividing -0.0246 by 1 -0.6990. This is evidence of a U.S. wage curve. At -0.08, its elasticity is the same as in the wage-curve literature summarized above. Nevertheless, Column 2 of Table 1 exhibits a considerable amount of autoregression in pay, and Blanchard and Katz (1997) and others make a valuable point in drawing attention to some Phillips-like effects in regional wages in the United States.
Although our paper goes on to consider many variations and checks, there is a sense in which the main point emerges from this simple comparison of the first two columns of Table 1 . Column 1 appears to be a Phillips Curve, but is specified too simply. Column 2, a fuller specification, is consistent with the kinds of wage curves that have been found in other countries. However, compared with some nations, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in the U.S. is high.
The level of state unemployment benefit enters positively and significantly in these, and later, wage equations. As far as we are aware, this finding is a new one. The same result holds true if the b variable is entered as a benefit/pay replacement ratio (this ratio can be obtained from the same data source and is defined as the average weekly benefits/average weekly wages in the state from UI records). Ideally there should be an instrument for b, but here we have to treat benefits as exogenous. Table 2 's second column also finds that higher union density in a state is associated with higher wages in that state, ceteris paribus. 8
Column 3 of Table 1 switches to include the log, rather than the level, of benefits. The change makes little difference. The size of the effects from benefits in column 3 seems plausible: a 100 per cent increase in the amount of benefit increases hourly wages in the long run by approximately 15 per cent.
In line with the theoretical framework outlined earlier, it is necessary to address the endogeneity of wages and unemployment. Column 4 of Table 1 begins this. It is estimated by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and instruments the log of the unemployment rate with one and two lags of itself. Instrumenting produces a noticeable change in the size of the effects. Comparing Column 4 to Column 2, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is approximately the same, but the coefficient on unemployment has almost doubled in absolute value. As a result, the estimated value of the long run unemployment elasticity of pay rises in absolute value to close to -0.16.
Adding in state-specific time trends, as done by Bell, Nickell and Quintini (2002) for Great Britain, turns out to reduce the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable still further. This is done in Column 5 of Table 1 . Here, although still statistically well determined, the estimated size of the unemployment elasticity of pay is only approximately -0.03. However, no instrumenting is done in column 5.
Within Table 1 , Columns 6 and 7 provide the fullest specifications. The unemployment variable is instrumented; an unemployment benefits measure is included as an independent variable; union density is included; there are year dummies, industry controls, state dummies, and state time trends. In both columns, the unemployment elasticity of pay is estimated at approximately -0.1. Given their completeness, it might be natural to view these as the most compelling specifications.
An alternative to estimation with year dummies is to include instead the aggregate wage in the United States (see Blanchard and Katz, 1999) . This turns out here to make relatively little difference. Estimates of this kind using the private sector hourly wage of production workers, based around a version of Table 1 , are given in Appendix 2a using both OLS (column 1) and GLS (column 2). The results are the same. We also experimented with the private sector weekly wage of production workers and obtained similar results. For completeness, to allow for the possibility of endogeneity of the benefits variable, b, columns 3 and 4 in Appendix Table 2a report a version of Table 1 with that variable omitted; there is still evidence of a wage curve whether OLS or GLS is used (columns 3 and 4 respectively).
How robust is the wage curve?
We now attempt to probe the robustness of the -0.1 finding. Tables 2 and 3 perform simple experiments. In each table the sample is first restricted to Rightto-Work (RTW) and then to non-RTW states. 9 In effect, this is a division between states where unionism is weak and where it is stronger. Second, the sample is split into halves, and equation estimates are reported separately for the periods 1980-1991 and 1992-2002 . Third, education controls are added. Table 2 uses OLS; Table 3 instruments the unemployment rate with its first two lags.
Interestingly, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in Table 2 is lower in RTW states than it is in non-RTW states. This may in part be because union contracts are traditionally for a period of two or three years, so in this sector there is automatically a degree of autoregression.
In Table 2 the long run unemployment elasticity of wages changes a little: it is -0.05 in Column 1 and -0.08 in Column 2. Barth et al (2002a, b) argue that wage flexibility is greater in the nonunion sector in the US. Indeed, they state that there is no wage curve for their sample of union workers. However, their work had to rely on fairly small cell-sizes in the union sector. This is likely to be a particular problem in the southern RTW states where union membership is low.
Adding education controls --again these are averages at the state level --into Table 2 reduces the unemployment elasticity of pay to a value of -0.04 in Column 3. There is, however, no completely consistent way to control for educational levels; there was a change in the CPS education question from 1992.
When the data are divided into two time periods, an interesting outcome is produced. This division is done in Columns 3 to 6 in Table 2 . The lagged dependent variable is found to have a markedly smaller coefficient in the second period (that is, for the years 1992-2001) than in the first (period 1980-91) . Moreover, in Column 4, the coefficient on the local unemployment rate is almost exactly zero. However, these estimates ignore simultaneity.
Endogeneity of unemployment is allowed for in each of the columns of Table 3 . Across specifications, the long-run unemployment elasticity of the wage curve varies from a low of -0.06 to a high of -0.14. The fullest specification, and probably the most reliable, is in Columns 5 and 6. State time trends are included. So too are year dummies, industry controls, state fixedeffect dummies, and in Column 6 of Table 3 also education controls. In the first period, the unemployment elasticity of pay is estimated at -0.07. In the later period, the elasticity is -0.12. It seems best simply to conclude that these estimates cluster around -0.1. Table 4 now explores the sensitivity of the results to measurement error by instrumenting the lagged dependent variable itself. The approach follows that of Staiger, Stock and Watson (2002) . To obtain an instrument, the authors' paper exploits the fact that the ORG files are obtained monthly.
A suitable instrument must be correlated with lagged pay but uncorrelated with the other variables in the wage equation. Our approach relies on the fact that the data set is collected throughout each calendar year. We create two wage variables. One averages the pay data in even months (i.e., February, April, June and so on). The other is an average of pay in the odd months. This is done to overcome the problem that, as many states have small numbers of CPS respondents, estimated wage equations can exhibit errors-in-variables bias. Staiger et al (2002) split the monthly ORG files into these two independent samples (although households appear twice in the survey, the odd and even months have no households in common). Their innovative suggestion is this:
"Estimates from both the odd and even month samples will be measured with error, but because the samples are randomly drawn, the estimation error is independent in these two samples. Thus one set of estimates can be used as an instrument for the other set of samples." (p.39, 2003) .
A number of possibilities exist, so we go further and obtain separate wage estimates for individuals in the CPS in (a) the odd months, (b) the even months, (c) the first six months, (d) the second six months, (e) the first and third quarters, and (f) the second and fourth quarters. All should be valid instruments. A further question that needs to be addressed is whether it is appropriate to instrument the odd months with the even, as Staiger et al (2002) do, or vice versa. Table 4 presents various specifications. The most persuasive equations are in part C of the table, but the others are presented for completeness. Table 4 has three parts: the first, A, where industry dummies are not included as controls; part B where they are; and part C which includes state time trends and industry controls. Interestingly, the lagged dependent variable has a bigger coefficient when the evens are used to instrument the odds than when the reverse is true. A similar picture emerges when the two halves or the quarters are used; the use of past values to instrument current values generates a smaller coefficient on the lag on the dependent variable. Table 4 deliberately presents a battery of estimates to show how the results move away from a lagged dependent variable approximately equal to unity. If the past affects the future only through the present, then instrumenting the present with the past would seem appropriate and the cleanest way to do so is to instrument the second six months with the first six months. Our preferred specification in Table 4 is therefore row 4 in part C where the even months are instrumented with the odd months. Here the lagged dependent variable has a coefficient of 0.60 and the estimated long run unemployment elasticity of wages is approximately -0.075. Table 5 goes a little further. It reports results where the lagged dependent variable w t-1 and the unemployment rate U t are both instrumented. Table 5 's aim is to try to correct, within the same estimating equation, for the endogeneity of unemployment and measurement error in the dependent variable. In the equations of Table 5 , the dependent variable is derived from the second six months of CPS data, January-June. Then the lagged dependent variable is itself instrumented with the wage derived by averaging data from the first six months, July-December. As before, the unemployment rate in time t is instrumented with the unemployment rates at t-1 and t-2.
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is approximately 0.81 in the first column of Table 5 . It has a small standard error, and a (Phillips Curve) null hypothesis of unity is still comfortably rejected at normal significance levels. Column 2 of Table 5 adds state time-trends. Once this is done, the coefficient on w t-1 drops to approximately 0.71. As before, there appears to be some difference between the right-to-work (RTW) states and the non-RTW states. The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are noticeably different between columns 3 and 4 and 5 and 6. The addition of state time-trends has a noticeably large impact in the sample of RTW states, whereas in non-RTW states the results in columns 5 and 6 are similar to one another. The long run unemployment elasticity of wages is somewhat lower in the RTW states.
Another experiment is to alter the nature of the dependent variable. Up to this stage, the estimation in the paper has used data on hourly wages. It is a matter of judgment whether a pay variable is better defined as hourly or annual. While theoretical economics might favor an hourly variable, there are practical disadvantages in empirical work. Most American workers are not paid by the hour and are not aware of their own hourly wage rate but they do know their annual pay. Annual earnings data are reported in the CPS in March of each year. Annual earnings are reported on a worker's W2 form from their employer, which also appears on the individual's tax return filed in April of each year.
From Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) , Blanchard and Katz (1997), and Card (1995) , it is known that wage curves estimated with annual pay variables tend to exhibit relatively little autoregression. To explore this in the latest data, Table 6 switches to annual earnings as a dependent variable. The table draws upon data from the Annual Demographic March files of the CPS. These files contain information on each interviewed worker's earnings in the preceding year. We calculate weighted averages of earnings, using the earnwt variable, and map that to our file. This is done at the level of the state/year cell. Other control variables, including age, gender and industry, are derived from the ORG files and are the same as those used previously in Tables 2-4 . Data are available on the numbers of weeks worked during the preceding year and the usual hours. In Table 6 , columns 1-4, 6 and 7 are pay equations estimated for full-time/fullyear workers, defined as those who worked for 52 weeks and at least 35 hours per week. In columns 5 and 8 of Table 6 we impose no such restrictions and use the level of wages in the region. Sample sizes for state/year cells range from an average of 760 workers in Vermont to 6,527 in California. Overall, sample sizes are smaller in the March files than in the ORGs; they average about 75,000 cases in the former case and 165,000 in the latter. To deal with the possibility that small sample sizes might be responsible for the results, in columns 4 and 5 a set of weighted estimates are also given. These use as weights the cell counts obtained when we averaged. Reassuringly, weighting turns out to have a negligible effect. Table 6 's results are fairly strong. In all but one column there is a well-determined effect from local unemployment upon the level of pay. The estimates of the long-run unemployment elasticity in Table 6 are generally consistent with, though a little lower than, those obtained in Tables 2-5 . They range here from -0.02 to -0.12. As in previous research, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is smaller than in the ORGs. Including state effects, year effects and industry controls, the coefficient on w t-1 is around 0.35. Adding in state time-trends reduces the lagged coefficient on the wage still further, to around 0.13, whether OLS or GLS is used. Average weekly benefits remain strongly significant at conventional levels, and positive in all specifications.
Appendix Table 2b explores a number of other issues.
First, it examines the extent of any bias when estimation does not take account of the fact that a significant proportion of wage observations in the ORGs are imputed. Column 1 of this Table is the equivalent of column 2 of Table 1; column 2 of Appendix Table 2b takes the same specification but now includes all observations of the wage, whether imputed or not. The bias from including the imputed observations appears to be miniscule.
Second, we use an alternative estimation method. Developed by Blanchard and Katz (1997) , it involves a two-stage procedure. At the first stage a wage equation is estimated in each year with a number of controls included to distinguish differences in worker and workplace characteristics, and the coefficients on the state dummy variables are then used at the second stage. In five of the six specifications that Katz and Blanchard (1997) report in their Table 2 , they do not include any average worker or workplace controls at the second stage; when they do, the size of the lagged dependent variable falls from .633 to .258 when the March CPS (1980-1991) is used. Column 3 of Appendix Table 2b provides the results using their two-stage procedure with the same set of controls as used in column 2 also with the imputed data excluded for the period 1980-2001. Now the lag is .744 with industry controls included, and comparable to the result in column 1, with a long-run elasticity of -.11. In column 4, the coefficient on the lagged wage is higher when the industry variables are excluded. Omitting the age and gender variables, in column 5 of Appendix Table 2b , has little further impact.
If the sample is restricted to the years 1980-1991 that were available to Blanchard and Katz, and we include only non-imputed data at the first stage, and only year and state dummies as additional controls at the second stage, we get exactly the result they obtained in column 3 of their table. As can be seen below, the results are different when either more years or more controls are added at the second stage or both (controls are as in Appendix 
Unemployment equations
Lying behind each of these wage equations is, implicitly, an unemployment equation. As explained earlier in the paper, it takes the form U t = Ω(U t-1 , U t-2 , w t , controls).
The natural justification for this form is to define area unemployment as U = P(w t , controls) -N(w t , controls) where P is the participation rate in the area and N is the level of employment demand in the area. We assume the customary AR (2) form of an employment function, and also that participation is a non-decreasing function of the wage in the area. Then the unemployment rate in a state, in time period t, is a function of itself lagged twice and of the current wage rate. With these assumptions, the wage should enter positively in the estimated unemployment equation. The greater is the price of labor, the lower will be the level of labor demand and the higher the degree of labor force participation, and so, other factors constant, the higher will be the unemployment rate.
In principle the wage variable inside the unemployment equations should be in real rather than nominal terms, which means that annual state-level price indexes are required. Such data do not exist. However, subject to the assumption that there are not significant variations in the state structure of prices, year-dummies can be used as an alternative.
It is useful to study the exact empirical structure of this unemployment equation when fitted to US data over the period. A central concern of the analysis here is whether well-behaved unemployment equations can be estimated once both state fixed-effects and year effects are incorporated. There appears to have been little attempt before in the U.S. literature to estimate such equations. The well-known paper by Blanchard and Katz (1992) on regional evolutions comes close to this, but it focuses primarily on employment rather than unemployment data per se. Table 7 presents a selection of state unemployment equations. It includes controls for workers' age and its square, gender, the log of hourly and annual pay, and union density in the state.
Extra controls are added as we move across the columns of Table 7 . In later columns, in line with the theoretical framework, the level of pay is instrumented using the state benefits level. Column 1 contains only year dummies. The coefficient on the first of the two lagged dependent variables is approximately 0.9. Hourly pay is positive but poorly determined. Union density has no effect. Column 2 of Table 7 adds state fixed-effects into the specification. Once this is done, the unemployment equation begins to take the form that might be expected from economic theory. Unemployment is autoregressive: U t-1 enters with a coefficient of approximately 0.8 and U t-2 with a coefficient of approximately -0.08. Log hourly pay now has a large and welldetermined positive coefficient. The coefficient on union density is positive, although the tstatistic remains weak. These results are consistent with an inverted labor demand function.
It is natural to examine the implied long run elasticity. Column 2 of Table 7 can be solved out, in the usual way, for a steady-state logarithmic equation in which the wage elasticity of unemployment is approximately 0.6.
Column 3 of Table 7 introduces 44 industry dummies. The size of the union density effect increases and becomes significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The second lag on unemployment loses significance. As an experiment, column 4 replaces the hourly pay variable from the ORGs with the annual pay variable taken from the March CPS data. The pay variable remains significant at the 5% level.
In Table 7 , columns 5 through 7, the unemployment equations are estimated with 2SLS. The pay variables are instrumented by the state's average weekly benefit. This correction for endogeneity has the effect of markedly increasing the coefficient on pay in an unemployment equation. It also reduces the size of the U t-2 effect. The coefficient on union density is then poorly determined in all later specifications. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and OECD (1994) have argued that high levels of unionization are part of the explanation for differences in unemployment across countries. 10 Whatever the evidence across countries, it does not seem, controlling for the wage, that there is reliable evidence for this claim across the states of the USA. However, we have not attempted to explore the reduced-form effects of unions.
Empirical Results on Happiness and Job-Finding
This section presents evidence that can be viewed as complementary to the earlier wage equations. It uses subjective data to explore how workers' wellbeing and perceptions are influenced by the local rate of unemployment.
Implicit in the paper's analytical approach to the labor market are two building blocks. One is the idea that a rise in local unemployment weakens workers' utility relative to employers' utility. To be more specific, the expected utility level of a worker should, according to the theory, be lower in areas where unemployment is high. The reason is that in such areas the typical employee is more fearful of job loss. Such a prediction is captured in the theoretical equation 1 given earlier in the paper (because the level of expected utility is a decreasing function of unemployment, U). Second, the worker's perceived chance of finding another job if laid off is, according to the theory, a declining function of the local unemployment rate. In principle, both these ideas can be checked empirically. The problem in practice is the availability of appropriate data.
We test these two hypotheses by using information on reported happiness and on workers' jobfinding perceptions. We draw upon data from the General Social Survey (GSS) series for the United States. Although still little used by economists, the GSS contains useful data on workers' attitudes and subjective wellbeing.
Happiness data in the GSS are available for most of the years between 1972 and 2002 (there were no surveys conducted in 1979, 1981, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001) . We were able to map onto the survey series the state/year unemployment rates. 11 Data are available in 45 states; surveys have not been conducted in 6 small states (Maine, Hawaii, New Mexico, Nebraska, Idaho and Nevada).
First, we estimate a series of happiness equations based upon the specifications used --for a different purpose --in Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) . The specific focus here is upon workers' subjective wellbeing and on how that is shaped by the state of the local labor market. Second, we explore a variable measuring an individual's fear of unemployment, and again attempt to see how it is affected by labor-market conditions.
In the GSS, respondents are asked to report their levels of subjective wellbeing. The question asked is:
Taken all together, how would you say things are these days --would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?
On average, between 1972 and 2002, approximately 32% of respondents said they were very happy, 56% were pretty happy, and 12% not too happy. We treat this as a dependent variable.
The first two columns of Table 8 estimate ordered logit happiness equations for the pooled years 1972-1998. State dummies and year dummies are included. Because of the inclusion of the state unemployment rate in an equation estimated at the level of the individual, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level.
For the sake of completeness, the first column of Table 8 estimates a happiness equation for the full GSS sample, that is, one including non-workers. The log of the local unemployment rate here enters negatively, with a t-statistic of 1.78. In other words, Americans who live in a state with higher unemployment report lower happiness scores, but this effect is not quite statistically significant at the 5% level.
When the sample is restricted to workers, however, in column 2 of Table 8 , it can be seen that the unemployment effect becomes better determined. The coefficient is now -0.17 with a tstatistic of 2.19. Although the coefficients in ordered logits are not straightforward to interpret, it can be checked that this implies that higher unemployment in the area makes employees systematically less likely to report themselves in the two happier categories of the GSS survey responses.
In Table 8 , therefore, a higher local unemployment rate is associated with a lower reported level of workers' utility. This finding is consistent with that in country-level data, as discussed in Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001) and Oswald (1997a) . It is similar to the UK results on 'fear' of unemployment in Blanchflower (1991) .
Column 3 of 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1989-1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 . The percentage of people saying it would be 'very easy' to find a job was highest in 2000, when the US unemployment rate was lowest at 4%. Conversely, the proportion saying it was 'not easy' was highest in 1982, when unemployment was at its peak of 9.7%.
Column 3 of Table 8 estimates an ordered logit where the dependent variable is the individual's perception of how easy it would be to find a comparable job elsewhere. This is a subjective variable, of course, but it seems potentially of interest. The estimated perceived-chance-offinding-a-job equation is an attempt to show how fear of unemployment (or more precisely, the local rate of unemployment) works: it influences workers' feelings about the probability of finding a new job. Such a finding is required if the conceptual framework proposed for the wage curve is the correct one. Standard errors are once again adjusted for clustering. The likelihoodof-finding-a-job equation captures the subjective probability of getting work and has a negative gradient with respect to the state unemployment rate. With a t-statistic of 4.79, the impact of the log of state unemployment in column 3 of Table 8 is a well-determined one. This finding is consistent with one part of the wage-curve framework.
The fact that the log of state unemployment enters significantly and negatively is compatible with results in Blanchflower and Oswald (1999) and Schmidt (1999) . A greater rate of joblessness in the worker's region leads, it might be said, to a diminution of that worker's power relative to the firm. As local unemployment rises, workers become less confident about being able to secure a position with another employer.
Although the data used in this section are of a more subjective kind than used by most labor economists, they paint a picture that is consistent with the analytical foundations of the wagecurve. Unemployment in the local area acts to lower workers' reported happiness and to reduce individuals' perceived chance of finding a job.
Conclusion
Economics has few empirical laws. It is important to know if the wage curve qualifies as one.
Although evidence for such a curve has been found in more than 40 countries, the existence of a wage curve in United States data has been viewed as controversial.
The estimates in this paper use a longer period of data than has been possible before. It also attempts to correct for endogeneity and measurement error. The paper finds --consistent with an efficiency-wage framework --that wages are lower in U.S. states with higher unemployment. As has been discovered in many other nations, this wage curve has a long run elasticity of approximately -0.1. A number of other results emerge. They are compatible with the theoretical framework proposed in the paper.
Wages are greater in states with more generous unemployment benefits.
The higher is the unemployment rate in a state, the lower are the levels of happiness reported by workers in that state.
The higher the unemployment rate in a state, the lower is the typical worker's perceived chance of finding a job.
Evidence for the wage curve is particularly strong in non-union (Right-to-Work) states.
Except in isolated specifications, there is not persuasive support for a simple Phillips curve. It seems more sensible to view the data as being characterized by dynamic fluctuations around a long-run wage curve. State wages in the United States are autoregressive (as explained in Card and Hyslop, 1997, and Blanchard and Katz, 1997) , but not extremely so. In many specifications, the coefficient on a lagged dependent variable is 0.5 or smaller. This paper's results seem consistent with the empirical law proposed in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) . The United States has a wage curve. Notes: both pay variables are instrumented by the average weekly benefit rate. Annual wage used relates to full-time/full-year workers. All equations also include age and % male as controls. t-statistics are in parentheses. Notes: The probability-of-finding-a-job variable is available for years 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1989-1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 . All equations also include 44 state and year dummies (21 for happiness and 15 for job-finding). Happiness equations also include 4 marital status dummies, and parents divorced when respondent age 16, as in Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) . Column 1 also includes dummies for unemployment, housework, student and retired. 
